创新成本共担期权契约下损失厌恶型零售商主导的供应链协调研究OA北大核心CHSSCDCSSCICSTPCD
Research on Supply Chain Coordination with Loss Averse Retailer-Led Supply Chain Under Innovation Cost Sharing Option Contract
在一个损失厌恶零售商和一个风险中性供应商组成的二级供应链中,本文研究了市场主导者零售商通过期权契约实现供应链创新行为协调机制,并分析了不允许信用违约和允许信用违约两种情形下的供应链技术创新协调问题.在此基础上,通过运用前景理论探讨了供应链成员的损失厌恶特性对期权契约协调的影响.研究表明,在创新成本共担的期权契约机制下能够实现供应链协调.最后,通过算例分析验证了结论.
In the supply chain composed of a loss averse retailer and a risk neutral supplier, this paper studies the market dominant retailer to achieve supply chain coordination mechanism innovation behavior through the option contract, and analyzes the supply chain coordination technology innovation under no credit default is allowed and allow credit default two kinds of problems. On the basis of this, the influence of loss aversion of supply chain members on the co…查看全部>>
张红;张凤武;周智雄
华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州 510640华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州 510640华泰联合证券广州分公司,广州 510000
管理科学
供应链协调期权契约损失厌恶创新投入零售商主导最优决策
supply chain coordinationoption contractloss aversioninvestment costretailer-ledoptimal decision
《工业技术经济》 2018 (4)
22-29,8
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