中国人口·资源与环境2017，Vol.27Issue(12)：21-30,10.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20170705
双重治理体制下政府碳排放监管博弈分析
Game analysis of carbon emission regulation under dual governance system
摘要
Abstract
Chinese-style decentralized management and economy-oriented promotion system force local government to pay more attention to economic growth rather than environment protection when making multi-objective decision.Based on central-local dual governance system of environmental regulation,this paper established a tripartite game model among central environment protection department,local environment protection department and carbon emission enterprise,and analyzed the influence of implementation of cascade carbon taxing policy to different subject behaviors.The equilibrium analysis of model found that under the dual governance system,local government's pursuit for economic performance will lead to the reduced environment regulation of local environmental protection department as well as the weakened carbon reduction performance of environmental regulation;when implementing cascade carbon taxing policy,enterprise's underlying carbon emission behavior was positively related to the inspection cost of local-central environment protection departments,while negatively related to their penalty coefficient.A reasonable carbon emission criterion is of great importance to restraining enterprises' secret discharge tendency and to reducing enterprises' carbon discharge quantity.Compared with single-standard carbon taxing,cascade carbon taxing can better stimulate local environment protection department to improve regulation performance.Pure economic measure cannot stimulate the local environmental protection departments' initiative for environmental inspection,for which auxiliary implementation of other measures is necessary.Using central-local dual governance system instead of conventional implementation method of environmental regulation policies,realization of central vertical management of environment protection department,introduction of environmental indexes into official promotion mechanism,and strengthening the inspection force of central environment protection departments are effective methods to improve the effect of carbon reduction policy.关键词
双层治理体制/中国式分权管理/阶梯式碳税/碳减排/政策绩效Key words
central-local dual governance/Chinese-style decentralization/cascade carbon taxing/carbon emission/policy performance分类
资源环境引用本文复制引用
吴士健,孙向彦,杨萍..双重治理体制下政府碳排放监管博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(12):21-30,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金面上项目“多任务委托代理关系下国企高管行为策略选择及优化研究”(批准号:71371111) （批准号:71371111）
国家统计局统计科研重点项目“我国科技投入产出效率测度与评价研究”(批准号:2010LB21). （批准号:2010LB21）
