中国人口·资源与环境2018，Vol.28Issue(3)：53-59,7.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20170910
从垄断到寡头:集体建设用地交易中政府和集体经济组织的收益分配关系研究
From monopoly to oligopoly: land revenue distribution between governments and collectives during the transaction process of rural construction land
摘要
Abstract
Allowing rural construction land to go to the market and establishing a unified rural-urban land market have been long targets of land system reforms in China.Along with rural construction lands market opening to developers,the land market structure shifts from monopoly to oligopoly.Under this circumstance,how to scientifically and reasonably allocate the land revenue between government and rural community is greatly significant to current supply reform.Therefore,this paper explores the land revenue distribution between governments and the collectives during the transaction process of rural construction land based on 365 cases from 2005 to 2014 in Jiangrnen City,which is a typical city in Pearl River Delta.By using comparative analysis to compare the tax standards in Jiangmen with Dongguan and Shunde,this paper builds simultaneous-equation model of transferring market of the rural collective construction land from the views of demand-supply and price equilibriums,and explores the market equilibrium relation and profit allocation relation between government and the collective from a micro perspective.The results show that:①Comparison of tax shows that although governments in Jiangmen,Shunde and Dongguan charge the same transaction service fees during collective land transaction,the setting standards of land revenue and land transferring fee vary in Jiangrnen,Shunde and Dongguan.②From 2005 to 2014,most of the land leasing revenue is obtained by related collectives,and the ratio of land revenue of local government and the collective during land transaction is 1 ∶ 6.45.③Trading price,land use type,time limitation and transaction frequency significantly affect the incomes of governments and the collective respectively.Therefore,it draws following conclusions:①The current standard of tax in rural collective construction land market is in chaos and governments intervene too much in revenue of collective construction land transaction.②Apart from transaction area,the other variables can affect the revenues of government and the collective with consistent direction.③Analyzing the revenue distribution relationship between governments and the collective can help to clarify their revenue boundaries in the oligopoly land market.关键词
寡头供给/收益分配/集体建设用地/土地交易/联立方程Key words
oligopoly supply/revenue distribution/rural construction land/land transaction/simultaneous equation model分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
文兰娇,汪晗,张安录..从垄断到寡头:集体建设用地交易中政府和集体经济组织的收益分配关系研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(3):53-59,7.基金项目
教育部社会哲学社科重大攻关项目“建立城乡统一的建设用地市场”(批准号:14JZD009) （批准号:14JZD009）
国家自然科学基金项目“国土空间管制下土地非均衡发展及空间外部性扩散机理与区域协调发展政策研究”(批准号:71373095),“经济社会双重转型下土地转换效率测度及效率改进政策调控研究”(批准号:71573101) （批准号:71373095）
中央高校科研基本业务费专项资金资助项目(批准号:2662016PY078 （）
2662017QD020). （）
