运筹与管理2018，Vol.27Issue(3)：50-58,9.DOI:10.12005/orms.2018.0059
公平偏好下考虑供应商质量投入的供应链契约协调
Supply Chain Contract Coordination Considering Supplier's Quality Investment under Fairness Preference
摘要
Abstract
The paper aims at the insufficiency that the traditional bonus-penalty contract based on quantitative criteria cannot adapt to the current demand characteristics of many varieties and small batch and coordinate the supply chain.In the context of fairness preference, this paper builds the bonus-penalty contract based on the product quality criteria provided by suppliers,to study how the contract influences the coordination of supply chain.Assuming the retailer is fairness preferred in the two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a supplier,the paper analyzes two situations, namely, the same and different channel power of supply chain participants.We find that the suppliers and retailers will cooperate in accordance with the contract, get a balanced result and achieve supply chain coordination,when the retailer has the same degree of concern for own income and fairness.Furthermore,the difference of channel power will much affect supply chain overall profit. Finally,a numerical example is given to demonstrate the model.关键词
供应链协调/公平偏好/奖励惩罚契约/质量水平Key words
supply chain coordination/fairness preference/bonus-penalty contract/quality level分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
闫峰,梁工谦,刘昕,聂磊..公平偏好下考虑供应商质量投入的供应链契约协调[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(3):50-58,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(U1404702) （U1404702）
陕西省软科学项目(2017KRZ002) （2017KRZ002）
西北工业大学研究生创意创新种子基金重点项目(Z2017054) （Z2017054）
