当代经济管理2018，Vol.40Issue(4)：22-29,8.DOI:10.13253/j.cnki.ddjjgl.2018.04.007
"两职合一"真正起到治理作用了吗?
Can CEO Duality Play a True Role in Corporate Governance?
陈晓珊 1匡贺武2
作者信息
- 1. 暨南大学 产业经济研究院,广东 广州510632
- 2. 华南师范大学 经济与管理学院,广东 广州510006
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Whether the arrangement of power structure of CEO Duality is easing the agency problem or aggravating the agency problem in the spe-cific practice of corporate governance is limited to the analysis of the direct relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance in the a-cademic circle. This paper empirically tests the impact of CEO duality on executive compensation-performance sensitivity from the perspective of management power, and then analyzes the governance effect of CEO duality. The results show that: CEO duality cannot play a true role in corporate governance; it can significantly improve the executive compensation while at the same time it can also reduce the executive compensation-perfor-mance sensitivity, which supports agency theory. The above conclusions are still established after a series of robustness tests, such as distinguishing the nature of the property right of enterprises, distinguishing the degree of competition in the industry, replacing the dependent variables and testing variables, processing testing variables and controlling variables with first order lag method. This paper provides a new perspective for the research of CEO duality. The research results can not only enrich the literature of corporate governance, but also provide theoretical support and decision-making reference for enterprises in the practice of how to set up executive power structure scientifically.关键词
"两职合一"/高管薪酬/高管薪酬-业绩敏感性/公司治理Key words
CEO duality/executive compensation/executive compensation-performance sensitivity/corporate governance分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈晓珊,匡贺武.."两职合一"真正起到治理作用了吗?[J].当代经济管理,2018,40(4):22-29,8.
