家畜生态学报2018，Vol.39Issue(3)：69-74,6.
动物疫情公共危机中地方政府与农户的决策行为博弈分析
An Analysis on the Decision-making Behavior of Local Government and Farmers in the Public Crisis of Animal Epidemic Based on Evolutionary Game
摘要
Abstract
The outbreak of animal epidemics has seriously affected the safety of human life,and the timely isolation and control of infectious diseases is a major means to control the spread of animal epidemic.It is of great practical significance to explore the isolation and control of major animal epidemics.In the process of actual isolation,there is a game relationship between the local government as the leader of the i solation work and the residents in the epidemic area.Based on the government credibility and the trust between the government and the people,the evolutionary game model of the local government and the epidemic area residents is constructed and analyzed.From the dynamic perspective,the evolutionary stability strategy and evolution rule of the two subjects were studied so as to find out the influencing factors of the evolution path,and provide some reference for the reasonable isolation strategy in epidemic area.The winwin cooperation between the local government and households who achieved isolation and killing objectives in epidemic area and residents who got reasonable compensation was the Pareto Optimality to solve isolation issues in epidemic area.Finally,in order to tackle problems existing in isolation compensation mechanism,it is proposed to reduce unexpected group events caused by forced isolation in epidemic areas,improve compulsory isolation system and compensation policy.关键词
隔离补偿/演化博弈/演化稳定策略/动物疫情公共危机Key words
isolation compensation/evolutionary game/evolutionary stability strategy/animal epidemic public crisis分类
农业科技引用本文复制引用
金熙,李燕凌..动物疫情公共危机中地方政府与农户的决策行为博弈分析[J].家畜生态学报,2018,39(3):69-74,6.基金项目
国家社科基金重大招标项目(11&ZD171) （11&ZD171）
湖南省科技计划重点项目(2015NK3010) （2015NK3010）
