管理工程学报2018，Vol.32Issue(2)：128-136,9.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2018.02.014
股票期权激励、行权业绩条件与真实盈余管理
Stock option incentive, exercise rights vesting performance requirements and real earnings management
摘要
Abstract
Since China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Rules on Administration of Listed Company Equity Incentive" in 2006,an increasing number of listed companies have launched the equity incentive plan.However,both theoretical and empirical studies show that the equity incentive system aimed to solve the principal-agent problems often causes the new moral hazard,such as earnings management behavior implemented by managers.In many empirical studies earnings management is defined as accrued earnings management.However,very few studies focus on if equity incentive compensation contracts will trigger managers to implement real earnings management motivation.On the other hand,performance-based-equity incentive is implemented in China,which is significantly different from the executive equity incentive implemented in the United States and other countries for a long time.For performance-based-equity incentive,whether stock options must be based on whether exercise rights vesting performance requirements is achieved.Moreover,whether stock options can be granted and whether the stock can be sold after stock options are exercised must be based on whether exercise rights vesting performance requirements are achieved.Therefore,exercise performance conditions become a basic element of equity incentive plan in China.How do performance-based-equity incentive affect earnings management behavior? Whether do managers in China implement real earnings management to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements? These problems still lack of research based on the examples of equity incentive in China.Using samples of listed companies in Chinese A share market which implemented equity incentive plans during the 2006-2014,this paper investigates the relationship between equity incentive and real earnings management based on the data of exercise rights vesting performance requirements in the equity incentive plan.This paper finds that the degree of real earnings management implemented by the company with an "incentive" equity incentive plan is greater than the one implemented by the company with a "non-incentive" equity incentive plan.The higher the exercise rights vesting performance requirements compared to company's past actual performance level,the greater the extent of real earnings management induced is.In order to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements,the listing corporation's managers will comprehensively use real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management.Concentration of ownership structure can restrain real earnings management level to a certain extent.The results show that it is very important to set a reasonable performance level m the equity incentive plans.Optimizing the ownership struture is significant for the suppression of the real earnings management behavior caused by equity incentive.The paper makes two najor areas of contribution.First,using exercise rights vesting performance requirements set in the equity incentive plan measure equity incentive intensity is an innovation on the measurement methods of equity incentive intensity designed for Chinese situation.Second,this paper enriches the current literatures about the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management from the perspective of real activities earnings management.关键词
股票期权激励/可行权业绩条件/真实盈余管理/应计盈余管理Key words
Stock option incentive/Exercise rights vesting performance requirements/Real earnings management/Accrual-based earnings management分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
刘银国,孙慧倩,王烨..股票期权激励、行权业绩条件与真实盈余管理[J].管理工程学报,2018,32(2):128-136,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71172190、71572001) （71172190、71572001）
国家社会科学基金一般资助项目(13BJY013) （13BJY013）
