运筹与管理2018，Vol.27Issue(4)：1-9,9.DOI:10.12005/orms.2018.0077
网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题
Buyer's Participation in the Two-sided Platform with Network Externality and Differentiation
摘要
Abstract
The main body of the two-sided platform is the platform itself and the users.The existence of the platform is based on the participation of the users.So the distribution of the users is the interest of the two-sided marhet.In the competitive two-sided marhet, this paper establishes a two-stage two-sided platform competition model.The paper uses the Rubinstein bargaining model to describe the differences between the sellers and decide the quotient of sellers in the first stage.The paper is divided into the profit maximization and social welfare maximization of the two cases in the second stage.We describe the size of the buyers on the platform preferences,and seeh equilibrium.Through this model,the influence of networh external coefficient on platform equilibrium marhet share and marhet staheholders' benefit is analyzed under competitive platform.The study shows that the number of buyers is involved by the size of the networh and the networh externalities.The scale of the platform is not case that the bigger the better.In considering the social welfare maximization, the buyer's participation is not affected by networh externality coefficient of buyers.But the total social welfare is positively related to it.关键词
双边平台竞争/用户分配/Rubinstein讨价还价模型/平台差异/网络外部性Key words
two-sided platform competition/user assignment/rubinstein bargaining model/platform differences/networh externality分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王先甲,余子鹤..网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(4):1-9,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目"复杂不确定性多主体多目标合作博弈与协商谈判的合作机制与合作模式"(71231007) （71231007）
