华中师范大学学报（自然科学版）2018，Vol.52Issue(3)：373-382,392,11.DOI:10.19603/j.cnki.1000-1190.2018.03.014
考虑零售商竞争和低碳宣传补贴的供应链合作减排
Supply chain cooperative emission reduction considered retailer competition and subsidies to low carbon propaganda
摘要
Abstract
A supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and two following retailers is considered to research on cooperative emission reduction and low carbon propaganda decision under the condition of retailer competition.The Stackelberg game theory is used to construct a decentralized decision-making game model for no subsidies (NS),single subsidies (SS) and double subsidies (DS).The equilibrium solution of emission levels,low carbon propaganda investment and the proportion of low carbon propaganda cost sharing are obtained.Through the comparative analysis,it is shown that DS model of manufacturer's profit,retailer's profit,level of emission reduction and total product demand are higher than that of NS,SS model;under the model of DS and SS,the low carbon propaganda investment is the same,while higher than the NS model;the proportion of low carbon propaganda cost sharing in DS and SS mode is the same as that of SS mode,negatively related to the marginal revenue and the coefficient of competition intensity of retailers,and positively related to the marginal profit of manufacturer.Final ly,a numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.关键词
合作减排/零售商竞争/低碳宣传/双重补贴/Stackelberg博弈Key words
cooperative emission reduction/retailer competition/low carbon propaganda/double subsidies/Stackelberg game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
俞超,汪传旭,王志华..考虑零售商竞争和低碳宣传补贴的供应链合作减排[J].华中师范大学学报（自然科学版）,2018,52(3):373-382,392,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(71373157) （71373157）
国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL216 （）
15CGL006) （）
江苏理工学院社会科学基金项目(KYY16507). （KYY16507）
