管理工程学报2018，Vol.32Issue(3)：214-225,12.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2018.03.025
"批发 + 佣金"模式下酒店与OTA的合作协调研究
Cooperation and coordination research between hotel and OTA under‘merchant + commission’ mode
摘要
Abstract
Owing to the development of e-commerce, a great number of online travel agencies (OTA) have emerged so that consumers can order hotel rooms online. As an important room distributor, OTA can even help sell hotel rooms half a year in advance of the offline selling period. Nowadays, there are two main types of cooperation modes between hotel and OTA. One of the cooperation modes is called commission mode and the other one is called merchant mode. Because both commission mode and merchant mode have advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, it is very meaningful to find an effective way to combine these two modes. Thus, this paper considers the ‘merchant + commission’ mode, which is gradually used in the hotel industry. In this paper, we develop a game model between a dominant hotel and OTA when considering the ‘merchant + commission’ mode. Under the ‘merchant +commission’ mode, hotel firstly decides the wholesale price and maximal quantity of available hotel rooms on OTA websites. Informed of the wholesale price and maximal quantity, OTA purchases a small number of hotel rooms under merchant mode. After the ordered rooms sold out, OTA can keep selling the rest available online rooms under commission mode. Firstly, we analyze the hotel wholesale pricing and room allocation strategy and the OTA room purchase strategy in the case of symmetric information. Secondly, the corresponding decisions for OTA are investigated in the case of asymmetric online demand information. Finally, we use numerical examples to analyze the coordination efficiency of the contract in the case of asymmetric information, and the sensitivity analysis is carried out according to the demand variation coefficient. The main contribution of this paper is that for the first time, we provide the optimal room allocation strategy for the online and offline channels of the hotels in the "wholesale + commission" mode and prove the existence of the optimal purchase rooms for the OTA. It is proved in this paper that there is double marginal effect between hotel and OTA in the case of symmetric information. By designing the two-part tariff contract, our results show that the hotel and OTA can achieve the perfect coordination and eliminate the bilateral marginal effect of the two sides. In addition, it can be proved that hotel may earn more revenue by acquiring ‘merchant + commission’ mode than commission mode when the commission rate is given. Finally, we also find that the total number of online pre-sale rooms has no correlation with the sale price of the OTA in the wholesale mode, only related to the difference between earnings from the online and offline channels in the commission model. The larger the different earnings, the fewer the number of online pre-sale rooms are. However, the above analyses are all based on symmetric information. In practical operation, OTA directly faces online consumers and has much more online demand information than the hotel. So, it is possible for OTA to acquire more revenue by providing hotel the false demand information. In the case of asymmetric online demand information, the results show that regardless of the high or low OTA's online demand, OTA always reports the "low demand" to hotel, which indicates OTA has the motivation to provide false information. We also design a coordination contract to help the hotel prevent OTA from reporting false information.关键词
酒店/线上旅行社/契约设计/信息不对称Key words
Hotel/Online travel agency/Contract design/Information asymmetry分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
曾小燕,嵇凯,周永务,钟远光.."批发 + 佣金"模式下酒店与OTA的合作协调研究[J].管理工程学报,2018,32(3):214-225,12.基金项目
国家社会科学基金资助项目(71501077、71520107001) （71501077、71520107001）
广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2014A030310212) （2014A030310212）
华南理工大学广州学院低碳经济与碳金融研究中心 （）
广东省教育厅青年创新人才类项目(2016WQNCX194) （2016WQNCX194）
