经济与管理研究2018，Vol.39Issue(7)：122-133,12.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000－7636.2018.07.011
投桃报李:CEO关联与公司风险承担
Returning the Favor:CEO Connectedness and Corporate Risk-taking
摘要
Abstract
This paper examines how CEO connectedness by appointing other top executives or participating in the selection and nomination process of directors affects corporate risk-taking and the moderating effect of CEO formal power. The results show that: ( 1 ) CEO connectedness by participating in the selection and nomination process of directors significantly reduces the level of corporate risk-taking;(2) CEO formal power,including CEO structural power and ownership power,reduces the influence of CEO connectedness with directors on corporate risk-taking.The conclusions expand existing researches on corporate risk-taking and CEO connectedness,and can remind listed companies that CEO may construct personal connections through participating in the selection and nomination process of directors,which may lead to excessive risk aversion to damage corporate potential earnings.关键词
CEO关联/雇佣关系/建议提名/CEO正式权力/公司风险承担Key words
CEO connectedness/employment relationship/recommended nominees/CEO formal power/corporate risk-taking分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李小玉,薛有志,周杰..投桃报李:CEO关联与公司风险承担[J].经济与管理研究,2018,39(7):122-133,12.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目"企业战略转型路径及其选择研究:以公司治理环境的约束性为视角"(71372092) （71372092）
天津社科重点项目"以公司治理为视角的制造企业服务化转型动力机制研究"(TJGL16－005) （TJGL16－005）
