控制理论与应用2018，Vol.35Issue(5)：627-636,10.DOI:10.7641/CTA.2018.70818
激励机制下合作行为的演化动力学
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by incentives
摘要
Abstract
Cooperation, a conundrum from the evolutionary perspective, has received increasing attention from various realms. Punishment has been found to be effective among all the mechanisms to promote cooperation. However, retaliation undermines the positive role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. This results in the query on the extensive application of punishment in nature. Moreover, reward for punishment which is ubiquitous has been overlooked in previous studies. To explore the underlying principle of such phenomena, we propose a simple model and study the evolution of cooperation when retaliation and reward are allowed in the context of decentralized and centralized punishments. The results illustrate that cooperation is never facilitated by decentralized punishment while it can dominate defection when punishment is centralized in the presence of retaliation. On the other hand, reward for altruistic punishment significantly improve the situation of cooperation such that cooperation can be advantageous over defection no matter whether the retaliation exists or not. Moreover, we find that cooperation and punishment can emerge in large scale populations with centralized punishment. Our study paves the way for understanding the roles of incentives in the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, it has important theoretical significance and engineering value for some practical problems, such as optimal scheduling and configuration in complex systems, and coordinated control of swarm robot systems.关键词
演化博弈论/合作行为/激励机制Key words
evolutionary game theory/cooperation/incentives分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
高世萍,武斌,杜金铭,王龙..激励机制下合作行为的演化动力学[J].控制理论与应用,2018,35(5):627-636,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(61751301,61533001,61603049,61703082),北京邮电大学青年创新项目(2017RC19),中央高校基本科研业务专项资金项目(N160403001)资助.Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61751301, 61533001, 61603049, 61703082), the Young Innovation Program, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (2017RC19) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (N160403001). （61751301,61533001,61603049,61703082）
