电力系统自动化2019，Vol.43Issue(2)：7-17,11.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180410009
基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制设计
Competitive Mechanism Design in Electricity Market Based on Fair Benefit Allocation
摘要
Abstract
Promoting the electricity price reform, and constructing a"fair, open, organized, competitive and complete"electricity market are critical tasks confronted by the new-round electric power system reform of China.At present, the foreign electricity markets generally adopt locational marginal prices (LMPs) for electricity market clearing.However, the existing theory and practice demonstrate that LMPs cannot incentivize market participants to be truth-telling, and cannot solve the problem of information asymmetry.To incentivize market participants to truthfully bid and thereby achieve an optimal allocation for electrical resources, a competitive mechanism in electricity markets is proposed based on fair benefit allocation.Firstly, the phenomenon and reason why the LMP mechanism cannot elicit truthful information while leading to market efficiency loss are analyzed.Then based on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) theory, a fair benefit allocation mechanism is proposed for day-ahead electricity markets, and it is proved that the proposed mechanism satisfies the properties of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and system cost minimization.The economic meaning why the proposed mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility is also explained.Case studies based on IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems validate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.关键词
价值公平分配/激励相容/边际价格/VCG机制Key words
fair benefit allocation/incentive compatible/locational marginal price/Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism引用本文复制引用
王剑晓,钟海旺,夏清,汪洋,赖晓文,郭新志..基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制设计[J].电力系统自动化,2019,43(2):7-17,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (51777102, 51537005) （51777102, 51537005）
中国科协青年人才托举计划 (YESS20170206).This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 51777102. No. 51537005) and Chinese Association of Science and Technology Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship Program (No. YESS20170206). （YESS20170206）
