电力系统自动化2019，Vol.43Issue(2)：18-24,75,8.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180615003
日前电力市场不完全信息条件下的电力供需双边博弈模型
Bilateral Game Model of Power Supply and Demand Sides with Incomplete Information in Day-ahead Electricity Market
摘要
Abstract
With the in-depth development of the direct power purchase by large consumers, the contradiction between the marketization of medium-long term bilateral transactions and the non-marketization of spot transactions has become increasingly prominent, thus the construction of the day-ahead electricity market is imminent.A bilateral game model is established with the incomplete information between power supply and demand sides in the day-ahead electricity market, which is aimed to provide a practical game scheme for both sides in the power transactions, so that both sides can obtain the greatest benefits in the power market.The model takes the direct power purchase price and amount as the key points of the game.For the part of the direct power purchase price, the generation cost factor is introduced and the co-integration theory is used to construct the relationship model between the direct power purchase price and the generation cost considering the error correction.The part of the direct electricity purchase amount is predicted by similar day method.Finally, the Nash equilibrium is used to find the solution of the bilateral game and the effectiveness of the proposed model is proved by an example.关键词
日前电力市场/双边博弈/发电成本/直购电价/直购电量/纳什均衡Key words
day-ahead electricity market/bilateral game/generation cost/direct power purchase price/direct power purchase amount/Nash equilibrium引用本文复制引用
蒋玮,吴杰,冯伟,段小峰,汤海波,吴磊..日前电力市场不完全信息条件下的电力供需双边博弈模型[J].电力系统自动化,2019,43(2):18-24,75,8.基金项目
国家重点研发计划资助项目 (2016YFB0901104) （2016YFB0901104）
国网江苏省电力有限公司科技项目 (J2017112).This work is support by National Key R&.D Program of China (No. 2016YFB0901104) and State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co. Ltd. (No. J2017112 ) . （J2017112）
