| 注册
首页|期刊导航|经济与管理研究|忠诚折扣的反垄断经济分析

忠诚折扣的反垄断经济分析

刘雅甜 林平 吴绪亮

经济与管理研究2019,Vol.40Issue(2):70-81,12.
经济与管理研究2019,Vol.40Issue(2):70-81,12.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2019.02.005

忠诚折扣的反垄断经济分析

Antitrust Economic Analysis Framework of Loyalty Discounts

刘雅甜 1林平 2吴绪亮3

作者信息

  • 1. 中国人民大学经济学院, 北京, 100872
  • 2. 香港岭南大学经济系, 香港, 999077
  • 3. 腾讯研究院, 北京, 100080
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The EU v. Intel case, which lasts for nearly a decade, sparks a discussion of what analytical framework and test methods should be used for loyalty discounts.Some scholars believe that loyalty discounts should use the analytical framework of predatory pricing and price cost testing, while others suggest that loyalty discounts should use an analytical framework for exclusive dealing with the equally efficient competitor test.The answer to the above questions needs to clarify the economic logic behind loyalty discounts. Taking the Intel case as the analysis scenario, this paper analyzes the theory of competitive damage of loyalty discounts.By comparing and analyzing the economic logic of predatory pricing and exclusive dealing, it is found that loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing should belong to the category of raising rivals ' costs. Therefore, loyalty discounts should adopt the analysis framework of exclusive dealing.Moreover, since the price below cost is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for loyalty discounts, loyalty discounts should be based on a more reasonable test, namely, the equally efficient competitor test rather than a price cost test.

关键词

忠诚折扣/掠夺性定价/独家交易/价格成本测试/同等效率竞争者测试

Key words

loyalty discount/predatory pricing/exclusive dealing/price cost test/equally efficient competitor test

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

刘雅甜,林平,吴绪亮..忠诚折扣的反垄断经济分析[J].经济与管理研究,2019,40(2):70-81,12.

基金项目

中国人民大学经济学院资助项目成果 ()

经济与管理研究

OA北大核心CHSSCDCSSCICSTPCD

1000-7636

访问量1
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文