海南师范大学学报（自然科学版）2023，Vol.36Issue(4)：382-386,5.DOI:10.12051/j.issn.1674-4942.2023.04.004
直接互惠下量子囚徒困境的演化稳定分析
Evolutionary Stability Analysis of Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma under Direct Reciprocity
摘要
Abstract
In order to explore how direct reciprocity and entanglement affect the evolution of cooperation,a quantum pris-oner's dilemma model under direct reciprocity is established by using the method of evolutionary game theory.The equilib-rium points of the game dynamics are calculated and the stability of the equilibrium points is analyzed.The influences of di-rect reciprocity parameters and entanglement on the equilibrium points are discussed.The results show that when the direct reciprocity parameter and the quantum entanglement are different,the cooperation strategy and the betrayal strategy are evolutionarily stable,and when the entanglement is greater than the critical value,the direct reciprocity behavior promotes cooperation.When entanglement is less than critical value,direct reciprocal behavior inhibits cooperation.Finally,the cor-rectness of the theory is verified by numerical simulation.关键词
演化博弈论/囚徒困境/直接互惠/量子纠缠度Key words
evolutionary game theory/prisoner's dilemma/direct reciprocity/quantum entanglement分类
数理科学引用本文复制引用
付子芮,王新颖,程程,张新立..直接互惠下量子囚徒困境的演化稳定分析[J].海南师范大学学报（自然科学版）,2023,36(4):382-386,5.基金项目
教育部人文社会科学规划项目(21YJA630116) （21YJA630116）
辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目(LJKMZ20221412) （LJKMZ20221412）
