黑龙江科技大学学报2023，Vol.33Issue(6)：796-803,8.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.2095-7262.2023.06.004
演化博弈下煤矿污染治理行为的数值仿真
Numerical simulation of control behavior in coal mine pollution based on evolutionary game
刘海涛 1倪东滟 1朱腾1
作者信息
- 1. 黑龙江科技大学 矿业工程学院,哈尔滨 150022
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
This paper aims to respond to the mine ecological environment governance policy of envi-ronmental protection planning,and improve the efficiency of coal mine pollution control.The study works by developing an evolutionary game model with the government and coal mining enterprises as the main bodies,and verifying the strategy evolution results of each subject by numerical simulation software.The results show that an ideal stable evolution strategy can be achieved under the condition of the strict super-vision chosen by government and the active implement pollution control regulations chosen by coal mining enterprises,at the same time,the probability of both parties choosing the ideal strategy is positively cor-related with fines,subsidies and indirect benefits within a certain range,but inversely proportional to the input treatment cost;These factors including a perfect reward and punishment mechanism from the gov-ernment for pollution control of coal mining enterprise,the main responsibility for the active pollution control of coal mining enterprises,and the right measures with purpose can urge the two parties to choose the benign environmental control strategies.关键词
煤矿污染/演化博弈/治理行为Key words
coal mine pollution/evolutionary game/control behavior分类
资源环境引用本文复制引用
刘海涛,倪东滟,朱腾..演化博弈下煤矿污染治理行为的数值仿真[J].黑龙江科技大学学报,2023,33(6):796-803,8.
