建筑设计管理2023，Vol.40Issue(9)：28-34,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1673-1093.2023.09.003
基于相对业绩评价的EPC模式下分包商激励机制研究
Incentive Mechanism for Subcontractors under EPC Mode Based on Relative Performance Evaluation
罗运宝 1刘春丽 2孙春玲2
作者信息
- 1. 国家能源集团国际工程咨询有限公司,北京 100011
- 2. 天津理工大学管理学院,天津 300384
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Taking the principal-agent problem between the EPC general contractor and subcontractors as the starting point,the article analyzes the incentive dilemma between the two;By analyzing the issue of information asymmetry between the general contractor and subcontractors,it establishes a relative performance evaluation system,and clarifiies evaluation indicators,weights,and calculation methods;Finally,the incentive mechanism is constructed by introducing relative performance evaluation into subcontracting contracts and establishing a subcontractor resource library.By using relative performance evaluation methods,the behavior of subcontractors can be objectively and accurately evaluated,and then incentives and punishments can be given.关键词
EPC模式/激励机制/相对业绩评价Key words
EPC mode/incentive mechanism/relative performance evaluation分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
罗运宝,刘春丽,孙春玲..基于相对业绩评价的EPC模式下分包商激励机制研究[J].建筑设计管理,2023,40(9):28-34,7.
