辽宁工程技术大学学报（社会科学版）2023，Vol.25Issue(6)：435-441,7.DOI:10.11955/j.issn.1008-391x.20230606
管理层激励与股价崩盘风险
Management incentives and the risk of stock price crash:empirical research based on listed manufacturing companies from 2010 to 2019
摘要
Abstract
In response to the risk of stock price collapse in manufacturing enterprises,this study empirically tested the relationship between management compensation incentives,equity incentives,and stock price collapse risk using manufacturing listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2019 as research samples.It research show that management compensation incentives can reduce the risk of stock price collapse,while management equity incentives can increase the risk of stock price collapse,and the higher the transparency of enterprise information,the more significant the impact of management incentives on the risk of stock price collapse.Information transparency has a positive moderating effect on the impact of two incentive policies on the risk of stock price collapse.The conclusion is beneficial for reducing the risk of stock price collapse of listed manufacturing companies.关键词
薪酬激励/股权激励/信息透明度/股价崩盘风险Key words
salary incentives/equity incentives/information transparency/risk of stock price collapse分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
郑树旺,王嘉葆..管理层激励与股价崩盘风险[J].辽宁工程技术大学学报（社会科学版）,2023,25(6):435-441,7.基金项目
辽宁省教育厅社科项目(LJKR0147) （LJKR0147）
