太平洋学报2023，Vol.31Issue(12)：71-82,12.DOI:10.14015/j.cnki.1004-8049.2023.12.006
国际气候谈判议题联合博弈模式探究:基于同盟安全困境理论视角
Research on the Game Model of Coalitions in International Climate Negotiations:From the Perspective of the Alliance Security Dilemma Theory
摘要
Abstract
As the main actors of international climate negotiations,the coalitions in the negotiations are of great significance to global climate governance.The coalitions have some similarities with the traditional al-liance,but there are also obvious differences.In international climate negotiations,it is common for coun-tries to have joint membership of multiple issues,and the unit of the coalition can be refined to specific is-sues,which means that the position choice of countries can be flexible.According to the alliance security dilemma theory,the positions of countries on specific issues in international climate negotiations can be summarized into four behavioral patterns namely the internal cooperation maintenance—external alignment,the internal cooperation maintenance—external differences,the internal cooperation withdrawal—external alignment and the internal cooperation withdrawal—external differences.By taking the BASIC Group in two international climate negotiations as cases,this paper analyzes the action strategies of the BASIC Group and their impacts.The internal cooperation and exit strategy temporarily destroys the unity of the coalition,while it does not affect the subsequent cooperation.Thus,although the coalition is looser than the alliance,it is more inclusive and stable as a weak bond.关键词
同盟政治/议题联合/联合阵线/国际气候谈判Key words
alliance politics/coalition/international climate negotiations/climate change分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
刘婧文..国际气候谈判议题联合博弈模式探究:基于同盟安全困境理论视角[J].太平洋学报,2023,31(12):71-82,12.基金项目
本文系国家重点研发计划项目"气候变化风险的全球治理与国内应对关键问题研究"课题一"全球气候治理关键问题研究"(2018YFC1509001)的阶段性研究成果. （2018YFC1509001）
