沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）2023，Vol.16Issue(6)：509-521,13.DOI:10.7688/j.issn.1674-0823.2023.06.05
政府奖惩机制下汽车行业逆向物流演化博弈分析
Game analysis of reverse logistics evolution in automobile industry under government reward and punishment mechanism
摘要
Abstract
In recent years,the number of end-of-life vehicles has continued to rise,but the annual recovery rate of end-of-life vehicles is less than 15％,resulting in increasingly prominent problems in environmental pollution and resource reuse,etc.Based on the problem description and hypothesis,an evolutionary game model is constructed between the government and the automobile manufacturer,and the different evolutionary stability strategies of both sides are analyzed and discussed.The results show that the operating costs of both parties only affect their own decisions;the social reputation of the government has no influence on the decision-making of the automobile production enterprises,while the social reputation of the automobile production enterprises has influence on the decision-making of both parties;the probability of error reward has a greater impact on government decision-making,and the probability of error punishment has a greater impact on the decision-making of automobile manufacturers.Finally,countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for the government to encourage automobile manufacturers to take the initiative to undertake the reverse logistics of end-of-life vehicles.关键词
报废汽车/逆向物流/演化博弈/政府/奖惩机制Key words
end-of-life vehicles/reverse logistics/evolutionary game/government/reward and punishment mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
闫妍,狄鑫悦..政府奖惩机制下汽车行业逆向物流演化博弈分析[J].沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）,2023,16(6):509-521,13.基金项目
辽宁省教育厅面上项目(LJKR0078). （LJKR0078）
