西安科技大学学报2023，Vol.43Issue(6)：1045-1053,9.DOI:10.13800/j.cnki.xakjdxxb.2023.0602
经营性自建房安全监管决策研究
Safety supervision decision-making of commercial self-built houses
摘要
Abstract
In order to deeply reveal the game relationship of participants in the field of commercial self-built housing,this paper used evolutionary game theory to construct a three-way evolutionary game model involving government regulatory departments,third-party safety appraisal institutions and com-mercial self-built housing owners.The strategy selection of the game subject was analyzed by replicating the dynamic equation.And then the stability of the equilibrium point of the system was analyzed by u-sing the Jacobian matrix.Finally,through numerical experiments and simulations,the influence of key parameters on the tripartite evolution game was discussed.The results show that the government super-vision department does not strictly supervise the penalties imposed by the higher authorities,and the support,rewards and punishments given by the government supervision department to the third-party appraisal institutions are the key factors affecting the system's tendency to the only stable evolutionary strategy combination(1,1,1).The behavior strategy of third-party appraisal institutions is greatly af-fected by the difference between the support,rewards and punishments and the improper benefits.And the evolution trajectory of self-built house owners and third-party appraisal agencies has a certain de-gree of synchronization.The rewards and punishments given by government regulators to self-built house owners and third-party appraisal agencies are the main factors affecting their strategic choices,and they are the main players exerting influence in this game system.The rewards and punishments mechanism and the dishonesty disclosure mechanism adopted by government regulatory departments for untrustworthiness can effectively reduce the probability of both choosing illegal strategies.关键词
安全管理/经营性自建房/三方演化博弈/仿真分析/奖惩机制Key words
security management/commercial self-built housing/tripartite evolutionary game/simula-tion analysis/rewards and punishments mechanism分类
资源环境引用本文复制引用
王莉,马郴羽,杨帅..经营性自建房安全监管决策研究[J].西安科技大学学报,2023,43(6):1045-1053,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(52074214,51504185) （52074214,51504185）
