证券市场导报Issue(1)：39-52,14.
问询函监管对股东并购决策投票行为的影响
摘要
Abstract
Using the sample of material asset restructuring events of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020,this paper investigates the influence of inquiry letter supervision on shareholders'voting behavior in M&A decisions.The results show that when the company receives an M&A inquiry letter,the voting participation rates of all shareholders and minority shareholders increase significantly,while the voting approval ratios of all shareholders and minority shareholders decrease significantly.The results of the moderating effect test show that when the company has less M&A experience or the degree of competition in the product market is lower,the voting participation rates of all shareholders and minority shareholders are higher after receiving the M&A inquiry letter.The lower the percentage of shares held by executives,the higher the voting participation rate of minority shareholders and the lower the voting approval ratios of all shareholders and minority shareholders after receiving the M&A inquiry letter.关键词
问询函监管/重大资产重组/股东投票/并购决策Key words
inquiry letter supervision/material asset restructuring/shareholder voting/M&A decision分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王思雨,范合君..问询函监管对股东并购决策投票行为的影响[J].证券市场导报,2024,(1):39-52,14.基金项目
国家社会科学基金一般项目"平台企业无序扩张中数字排斥行为的监管与治理研究"(项目编号:21BJY207) （项目编号:21BJY207）
