电力建设2024，Vol.45Issue(2)：171-182,12.DOI:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2024.02.015
考虑阶梯型碳交易的多负荷聚合商协同优化调度与成本分配
Collaborative Optimal Scheduling and Cost Allocation of Multiload Aggregator Considering Ladder-Type Carbon Trading
摘要
Abstract
The large-scale penetration of renewable energy sources poses significant challenges to the stable operation of power systems.Driven by double uncertainties on both the supply and demand sides,demand response resources based on terminal flexible loads need to be explored.Considering the load differentiation characteristics of different types of users,multitype load aggregators based on cooperation and win-win were introduced.Flexible dispatching of the power system was performed based on the complementary characteristics of the heterogeneous load response behaviors.Moreover,each load aggregator was assigned the dual status of a carbon trading integrator to enter the carbon trading market.A carbon trading model based on a reward-punishment ladder was constructed using the electricity load forecasting method to allocate carbon emission quotas for a system free of charge.Based on this,to minimize the sum of the operating costs of a cooperative alliance of multiple load aggregators,a pre-day optimization model of the interaction and cooperation among multiple aggregators was developed and solved.The Shapley value method was introduced for the cooperative game,and the cost was shared according to the contribution of each participant to the operation of the cooperative alliance.The results show that the overall and individual operational costs and the carbon emissions of the alliance are significantly reduced under the cooperative operation mechanism.关键词
需求响应/碳交易/负荷聚合商/成本分配/合作博弈Key words
demand response/carbon trading/load aggregator/cost allocation/cooperative game分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
任洪波,王楠,吴琼,时珊珊,方陈,万莎..考虑阶梯型碳交易的多负荷聚合商协同优化调度与成本分配[J].电力建设,2024,45(2):171-182,12.基金项目
This work is supported by the Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China(No.52094021000C).国家电网公司总部科技项目(52094021000C) （No.52094021000C）
