技术与创新管理2024，Vol.45Issue(1)：49-59,11.DOI:10.14090/j.cnki.jscx.2024.0106
政府行为、区块链技术与产品标准链建设演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game of Government Behavior,Blockchain and Product Standard Chain Construction
摘要
Abstract
To address issues such as standard conflicts and mismatches in the construction of product standard systems,this article constructs a product standard chain model based on blockchain and uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the impact of government behavior on enterprise participation in the product standard chain.On the basis of designing government supervision,government subsidies,and punishment mechanisms,the article analyzes the evolutionary game equilibrium of standard chain con-struction under the influence of government behavior and explores the existence conditions of each steady-state equilibrium.The results show that when there is no government participation,enterprises will choose not to go on the chain strategy,and in this case,the government needs to intervene in the enterpris's going on the chain behavior;that government subsidies will promote the enthusiasm of en-terprises to go online;that when more enterprises choose to go online,it will encourage companies that have not gone online to change their strategies,forming a"positive cycle";and that when around 50％of enterprises engage in"speculative"behavior and are punished,the strategy of the government and enterprises will evolve towards building a standard chain.As an emerging technology,the application of blockchain in the industrial chain requires government action support,which is of great significance for promoting the construction of standard chains.关键词
区块链/标准链/政府行为/演化博弈/模拟仿真Key words
blockchain/standard chain/government behavior/evolutionary game/simulation emulation分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
邢恩博,江涛,彭玉波,覃琼霞..政府行为、区块链技术与产品标准链建设演化博弈分析[J].技术与创新管理,2024,45(1):49-59,11.基金项目
浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY21G020005) （LY21G020005）
教育部后期资助项目(20JHQ060) （20JHQ060）
浙江省普通本科高校"十四五"教学改革项目(jg20220488) （jg20220488）
