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考虑配送交通风险的新零售平台、骑手及消费者三方演化博弈分析

汪翼 李秀晖 雒兴刚

系统管理学报2024,Vol.33Issue(1):46-58,13.
系统管理学报2024,Vol.33Issue(1):46-58,13.DOI:10.3969/j.issn1005-2542.2024.01.004

考虑配送交通风险的新零售平台、骑手及消费者三方演化博弈分析

Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of New Retail Platform,Deliverymen,and Consumer Considering Delivery Traffic Risk

汪翼 1李秀晖 1雒兴刚1

作者信息

  • 1. 杭州电子科技大学 管理学院,杭州 310018
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

In recent years,the traffic accident rate of deliverymen on new retail platforms has been rising,which has aroused widespread concern in the society.Due to concerns about delivery delays and customer complaints,deliverymen often choose dangerous driving behaviors such as violating regulations and speeding during delivery.To avoid customers complaining about delivery delays,more and more platforms are actively establishing delay compensation mechanisms,which provides compensation to customers whenever delivery delay occurs.However,whether such compensation mechanism can effectively reduce consumer complaints,and,in turn,affect the delivery behavior of deliverymen and reduce traffic risks in their delivery is an important issue worth studying.This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of platforms,deliverymen,and consumers.The platform determines whether to establish a delivery delay compensation mechanism for customers,the deliverymen determine the delivery behavior,and the customers determine whether to complain in the case of delay.It is found that the direct delay penalty on deliverymen is the most critical influencing factor in deliverymen's strategies.When this penalty is sufficiently large,any strategic choice made by the platform or consumers cannot change the"deliverymen's dilemma"where deliverymen generally evolve towards high risk delivery strategies.However,when the platform can have sufficient direct benefit from building compensation mechanism,and the platform and consumers generally have more empathy for deliverymen,the three-way evolution strategy equilibrium can achieve an ideal state:the platform builds an active compensation mechanism,deliverymen choose low-risk delivery mode,and consumers do not complain about delivery delay.

关键词

新零售平台/骑手困境/配送交通风险/超时补偿/演化博弈

Key words

new retail platform/deliverymen's dilemma/delivery traffic risk/overtime compensation/evolutionary game

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

汪翼,李秀晖,雒兴刚..考虑配送交通风险的新零售平台、骑手及消费者三方演化博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2024,33(1):46-58,13.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金重点项目(71831006) (71831006)

浙江省人文社会科学规划项目(19NDJC052YB) (19NDJC052YB)

系统管理学报

OA北大核心CSSCICSTPCD

2097-4558

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