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暗访督查如何运行:一个纵向府际信息互动的分析视角

郭道久 涂天诚

天津行政学院学报2024,Vol.26Issue(1):13-23,11.
天津行政学院学报2024,Vol.26Issue(1):13-23,11.DOI:10.16326/j.cnki.1008-7168.2024.01.002

暗访督查如何运行:一个纵向府际信息互动的分析视角

How Do Unannounced Inspections Work:A Perspective of the Vertical Inter-Government Information Interaction

郭道久 1涂天诚1

作者信息

  • 1. 南开大学,天津 300350
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

As a regular means of information supervision,the unannounced inspection is now widely used in vertical inter-government governance.Based on the perspective of vertical inter-government information interaction,this study argues that the reason for the initiation of unannounced inspec-tion is to alleviate the information asymmetry in the process of vertical inter-government"supervi-sion-reception inspection".The information fields applicable to unannounced inspection reflect the characteristics of high ambiguity of subordinate governance information,strong demand for superi-ors to obtain governance information and diverse types of various information tools.On this basis,this study also summarizes the operation process of unannounced inspection,that is,the fuzzy pro-cessing of supervision signals before the operation of the mechanism,the application of various in-formation acquisition methods during the operation of the mechanism,and the feedback of policy correction information after the operation of the mechanism.Aiming at the phenomenon of"unan-nounced inspection failure"that frequently occurs in the current supervision practice,this study ar-gues that it stems from the negative effects brought about by the anti-supervision of lower-level governments.Both the operation of the informal information network and the obstacles encountered by superiors in the process of collecting information in the field will affect the actual operational ef-ficiency of unannounced inspection.This is also the breakthrough point to get out of the predica-ment of"unannounced inspection failure".

关键词

暗访/督查机制/纵向府际互动/委托代理理论/信息监督

Key words

unannounced inspection/inspection mechanism/vertical inter-government interaction/principal-agent theory/information supervision

分类

社会科学

引用本文复制引用

郭道久,涂天诚..暗访督查如何运行:一个纵向府际信息互动的分析视角[J].天津行政学院学报,2024,26(1):13-23,11.

基金项目

国家社会科学基金重大项目"中国政府职责体系建设研究"(17ZDA101). (17ZDA101)

天津行政学院学报

OA北大核心CHSSCDCSSCI

1008-7168

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