首页|期刊导航|天津行政学院学报|暗访督查如何运行:一个纵向府际信息互动的分析视角

暗访督查如何运行:一个纵向府际信息互动的分析视角OA北大核心CHSSCD

How Do Unannounced Inspections Work:A Perspective of the Vertical Inter-Government Information Interaction

中文摘要英文摘要

作为常态化的信息监督方式,暗访督查如今被广泛应用于纵向府际治理中.从纵向府际信息互动的视角看,暗访督查的启动原因在于缓解纵向府际"督查—迎检"过程中的信息不对称问题.其适用的信息场域体现出下级治理信息的模糊度较高、上级获取治理信息的需求强烈与各类信息工具的种类多元等特征.暗访督查的运行流程体现为机制运行前对督查信号的模糊化处理、机制运行中对各类信息获取方式的应用以及机制运行后对政策纠偏信息的反馈.目前督查实践中频繁出现的"暗访失灵"现象则根源于下级政府信息反监督所带来的负面效应.无论是非正式信息网络的运作,还是上级在场域内信息采集过程中遭遇的阻碍,均会影响暗访督查的实际运行效能.走出"暗访失灵"困境的突破口也正在于此.

As a regular means of information supervision,the unannounced inspection is now widely used in vertical inter-government governance.Based on the perspective of vertical inter-government information interaction,this study argues that the reason for the initiation of unannounced inspec-tion is to alleviate the information asymmetry in the process of vertical inter-government"supervi-sion-reception inspection".The information fields applicable to unannounced inspection reflect the characteristics of high ambiguity of subordinate governance information,strong demand for superi-ors to obtain governance information and diverse types of various information tools.On this basis,this study also summarizes the operation process of unannounced inspection,that is,the fuzzy pro-cessing of supervision signals before the operation of the mechanism,the application of various in-formation acquisition methods during the operation of the mechanism,and the feedback of policy correction information after the operation of the mechanism.Aiming at the phenomenon of"unan-nounced inspection failure"that frequently occurs in the current supervision practice,this study ar-gues that it stems from the negative effects brought about by the anti-supervision of lower-level governments.Both the operation of the informal information network and the obstacles encountered by superiors in the process of collecting information in the field will affect the actual operational ef-ficiency of unannounced inspection.This is also the breakthrough point to get out of the predica-ment of"unannounced inspection failure".

郭道久;涂天诚

南开大学,天津 300350

政治法律

暗访督查机制纵向府际互动委托代理理论信息监督

unannounced inspectioninspection mechanismvertical inter-government interactionprincipal-agent theoryinformation supervision

《天津行政学院学报》 2024 (001)

13-23 / 11

国家社会科学基金重大项目"中国政府职责体系建设研究"(17ZDA101).

10.16326/j.cnki.1008-7168.2024.01.002

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