青岛大学学报（自然科学版）2023，Vol.36Issue(4)：77-83,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2023.04.13
考虑外来企业进入的两阶段定价和以旧换新选择研究
Research on the Two-stage Pricing and Selection of Trade-in Considering Invasive Firm Entry
摘要
Abstract
Aiming at the entry of invasive firms into the market to compete with incumbent firms,a two-stage dynamic pricing game model of incumbent firms was constructed.The impact of invasive firms'en-try on pricing and trade-in strategies for incumbent firms was analyzed.The results show that when there are not invasive firms,incumbent firms offer a trade-in strategy only when the innovation level of the up-graded product is low.When invasive firm enters,the incumbent firm does not provide the trade-in that will make some of the first-stage product holders no longer buy its ccpgraded products,while providing the trade-in will make all the first-stage product holders buy its upgraded products.关键词
Stackelberg博弈/两阶段定价/以旧换新/策略消费者Key words
Stackelberg game/two-stage pricing/trade-in/strategic consumer分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
曹宗宏,潘金鑫..考虑外来企业进入的两阶段定价和以旧换新选择研究[J].青岛大学学报（自然科学版）,2023,36(4):77-83,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金(批准号:72271004)资助 （批准号:72271004）
安徽省人文社科基金重点项目(批准号:SK2020A0277)资助 （批准号:SK2020A0277）
安徽省高校优秀拔尖人才培育资助项目(批准号:gxyqZD2019058)资助 （批准号:gxyqZD2019058）
安徽建筑大学博士启动基金(批准号:2019QDZ04)资助. （批准号:2019QDZ04）
