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不同权力结构下供应链外包减排微分博弈研究

徐登凯 张桂涛 王志远

青岛大学学报(自然科学版)2023,Vol.36Issue(4):84-91,8.
青岛大学学报(自然科学版)2023,Vol.36Issue(4):84-91,8.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2023.04.14

不同权力结构下供应链外包减排微分博弈研究

Differential Game Research on Emission Reduction of Supply Chain Outsourcing under Different Power Structures

徐登凯 1张桂涛 1王志远1

作者信息

  • 1. 青岛大学商学院,青岛 266061
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

In order to explore the influence of low-carbon service providers on carbon emission reduction in the supply chain,a two-level supply chain differential game model consisting of manufacturers and low-carbon service providers was constructed,and the optimal pricing decisions under different power struc-tures were obtained.The influence of various influencing factors on carbon emission reduction and supply chain profit was analyzed by numerical examples.The results show that the power imbalance of supply chain members reduces the total profit of supply chain,and the transfer of supply chain power affects the enthusiasm of low-carbon service providers in carbon emission reduction investment and research and de-velopment.Carbon trading sharing ratio is the key to the profit of manufacturers in unequal power deci-sion-making.Manufacturers should yield profits from carbon trading to low-carbon service providers in or-der to obtain greater economic and environmental benefits.

关键词

低碳供应链/碳交易/外包减排/不同权力结构/碳交易收益共享/微分博弈

Key words

low-carbon supply chain/carbon trading/outsourcing emission reduction/different power structures/carbon trading revenue sharing/differential game

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

徐登凯,张桂涛,王志远..不同权力结构下供应链外包减排微分博弈研究[J].青岛大学学报(自然科学版),2023,36(4):84-91,8.

基金项目

国家社会科学基金(批准号:19BGL091)资助. (批准号:19BGL091)

青岛大学学报(自然科学版)

1006-1037

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