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经销商再制造模式下政府最优补贴策略研究

谭欢欢 孙浩

青岛大学学报(自然科学版)2023,Vol.36Issue(4):103-112,10.
青岛大学学报(自然科学版)2023,Vol.36Issue(4):103-112,10.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2023.04.17

经销商再制造模式下政府最优补贴策略研究

Research on Optimal Government Subsidy Strategies under Retailer Remanufacturing Mode

谭欢欢 1孙浩1

作者信息

  • 1. 青岛大学商学院,青岛 266061
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

For retailer remanufacturing mode,two cases were considered respectively.One case is that the government implements remanufacturing subsidies with the goal of remanufacturing revenue maximiza-tion,and the other case is total social welfare maximization.On this basis,the optimal subsidy intensi-ties,the members'operational strategies and system performances were explored under three decision modes,i.e.,retailer collection(MR),third party collection and retailer power dominance(MRT)and third party collection and third-party power dominance(MTR).Then the influences of consumer prefer-ence were analyzed and different modes were compared.The conclusions show that under the remanufac-turing revenue goal,the optimal subsidy intensities with regard to consumer preference depends on the production cost of new product.Under total social welfare goal,the optimal subsidy intensities always in-crease with consumer preference.Under both two government goals,MR mode has the lowest optimal subsidy intensity.From the perspective of the manufacturer,retailer,consumers and social total welfare,MTR mode is the worst choice of the three modes,but it can generate the highest collection rate and re-manufacturing revenue.Under the remanufacturing revenue goal,the members'profits,consumer sur-plus and total social welfare of MR mode are better than those of MRT mode.Under the total social wel-fare goal,the members'profits of MRT mode exceed that of MR mode,and consumer surplus and total social welfare of MRT mode are the same as those of MR Mode.

关键词

经销商再制造/最优补贴/政府目标/再制造收益/社会福利

Key words

retailer remanufacturing/optimal subsidy/government goal/remanufacturing revenue/social warfare

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

谭欢欢,孙浩..经销商再制造模式下政府最优补贴策略研究[J].青岛大学学报(自然科学版),2023,36(4):103-112,10.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金(批准号:71974104)资助. (批准号:71974104)

青岛大学学报(自然科学版)

1006-1037

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