工业工程2024，Vol.27Issue(1)：137-144,154,9.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.230012
政府奖惩机制下港口危化品物流监管的三方演化博弈研究
A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Port Logistics Regulation of Hazardous Chemicals with Government Reward and Punishment Mechanisms
摘要
Abstract
In order to solve the problem of enterprises seeking rent from third-party professional organizations and lacking government supervision in logistics regulation,a tripartite evolutionary game model is established with port logistics enterprises,third-party professional organizations and port administrative departments.The evolutionary equilibrium law in logistics regulation is revealed through model solving and numerical simulation.Results show that the reward and punishment set by port administrative departments must satisfy the condition that the sum of reward and punishment for each party is greater than its respective speculative gain such that the combination of strategies(compliant operation,rejection of rent-seeking,and loose regulation)can be a stable evolutionary strategy;increasing the intensity of both reward and punishment is beneficial to the compliant operation of enterprises and also the implementation of third-party professional organizations to reject rent-seeking strategies,however,as the reward intensity increases,the supervision willingness of port administrative departments decreases,also its effect weakens;the evolution of enterprises toward compliant operation can be facilitated by improving the reputation gain of enterprises,increasing rent-seeking costs and the accountability for government failures.关键词
港口危险化学品/第三方专业机构/寻租行为/演化博弈/仿真分析Key words
port hazardous chemicals/third-party professional organizations/rent-seeking behavior/evolutionary game/simulation analysis分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李煜,王腾飞,周欢,刘景森..政府奖惩机制下港口危化品物流监管的三方演化博弈研究[J].工业工程,2024,27(1):137-144,154,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72104069) （72104069）
河南省重点研发与推广转型资助项目(182102310886) （182102310886）
河南大学研究生教育创新与质量提升资助项目(SYL19060145) （SYL19060145）
