工业工程2024，Vol.27Issue(1)：145-154,10.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.220211
"双碳"目标下政企及第三方检测机构三方演化博弈分析
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Among Government,Enterprises and Third-party Detection Institutions with the Goal of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutralization
摘要
Abstract
Under the government's low-carbon regulation,manufacturers and third-party detection institutions may conspire to seek rent,which leads to the frequent occurrence of"pseudo-green products"on the market.This paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of government,manufacturers,and third-party detection institutions.On this basis,the combination of stable strategies and implementation conditions for each participant are explored.Finally,through numerical simulation analysis,the impact of multiple factors,including the rent-seeking and speculative cost of manufacturers,the cost difference between producing high and low green products,the rent-seeking cost and benefits of third-party detection institutions,and the incentives and punishments for manufacturers and third-party detection institutions by government,on strategy selections of three participants and the stability of system optimization is discussed,to provide reference for government incentive and regulatory policies with the goal of carbon peaking and carbon neutralization.关键词
低碳生产优化/合谋寻租/演化博弈Key words
optimization of low-carbon production/rent-seeking conspiracy/evolutionary game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
刘琦铀,徐禧洛,张成科.."双碳"目标下政企及第三方检测机构三方演化博弈分析[J].工业工程,2024,27(1):145-154,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71803029) （71803029）
广东省自然科学基金资助面上项目(2019A1515011473) （2019A1515011473）
