"监督机制"还是"掏空行为":超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资OA北大核心CHSSCDCSTPCD

Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research object,this paper deeply explores the impact and mechanism of over-appointment of in-dependent directors on corporate environmental investment.The study found that over-appoint-ment of independent directors has a significant role in promoting corporate environmental invest-ment,that is,over-appointment of independent directors belongs to the"supervision mecha-nism".The mechanism test shows that the over-appointment of independent directors promotes the environmental investment of enterprises by inhibiting the short-sightedness of management and the tunneling of major shareholders.Further analysis shows that in heavily polluting indus-tries,two-in-one and low-paid independent directors,the over-appointment of independent direc-tors has a more significant role in promoting corporate environmental investment.