财经理论与实践2024，Vol.45Issue(2)：94-103,10.DOI:10.16339/j.cnki.hdxbcjb.2024.02.012
"监督机制"还是"掏空行为":超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资
"Supervisory Mechanism"or"Tunneling Behavior"Over-appointment of Independent Directors and Corporate Environmental Investment
摘要
Abstract
Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research object,this paper deeply explores the impact and mechanism of over-appointment of in-dependent directors on corporate environmental investment.The study found that over-appoint-ment of independent directors has a significant role in promoting corporate environmental invest-ment,that is,over-appointment of independent directors belongs to the"supervision mecha-nism".The mechanism test shows that the over-appointment of independent directors promotes the environmental investment of enterprises by inhibiting the short-sightedness of management and the tunneling of major shareholders.Further analysis shows that in heavily polluting indus-tries,two-in-one and low-paid independent directors,the over-appointment of independent direc-tors has a more significant role in promoting corporate environmental investment.关键词
超额聘任独立董事/管理层短视/大股东掏空/企业环保投资Key words
over-appointment of independent directors/short-sighted management/large shareholders hollowed out/enterprise environmental protection investment分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
熊磊,陈镜西,苏春,李先洪.."监督机制"还是"掏空行为":超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资[J].财经理论与实践,2024,45(2):94-103,10.基金项目
国家社会科学基金青年项目(20CJY040) （20CJY040）
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2022M720615) （2022M720615）
重庆市博士后研究项目特别资助项目(2022CQBSHTBT001) （2022CQBSHTBT001）
重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYS22684) （CYS22684）
