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一种基于联邦学习参与方的投毒攻击防御方法

刘金全 张铮 陈自东 曹晟

计算机应用研究2024,Vol.41Issue(4):1171-1176,6.
计算机应用研究2024,Vol.41Issue(4):1171-1176,6.DOI:10.19734/j.issn.1001-3695.2023.07.0340

一种基于联邦学习参与方的投毒攻击防御方法

Defense method on poisoning attack based on clients in federated learning

刘金全 1张铮 1陈自东 2曹晟2

作者信息

  • 1. 国能大渡河大数据服务有限公司数据安全组,成都 610041
  • 2. 电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院(网络空间安全学院),成都 611731
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The distributed training structure of federated learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks.Existing methods mainly design secure aggregation algorithms for central servers to defend against poisoning attacks,but require the central server to be trusted and the number of poisoned participants to be lower than normal participants.To address the above issues,this paper proposed a poison attack defense method based on federated learning participants,which transfered the execution of defense strategies to the participants of federated learning.Firstly,each participant independently constructed a differential loss func-tion,calculated the output of the global and local models,and conducted error analysis to obtain the weight and amount of dif-ferential loss.Secondly,it performed adaptive training based on the local trained loss function and differential loss function.Finally,this approach selected models based on the performance analysis of local and global models to prevent severely poisoned global models from interfering with normal clients.Experiments on datasets such as MNIST and FashionMNIST show that the federated learning training accuracy based on this algorithm is superior to poison attack defense methods such as DnC.Even when the proportion of poisoned participants exceeds half,normal participants can still achieve defense against poison attacks.

关键词

联邦学习/投毒攻击防御/训练权重/鲁棒性

Key words

federated learning/poisoning attack defense/training weight/robustness

分类

信息技术与安全科学

引用本文复制引用

刘金全,张铮,陈自东,曹晟..一种基于联邦学习参与方的投毒攻击防御方法[J].计算机应用研究,2024,41(4):1171-1176,6.

基金项目

四川省重点研发计划资助项目(2021YFG0113,2023YFG0118) (2021YFG0113,2023YFG0118)

计算机应用研究

OA北大核心CSTPCD

1001-3695

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