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基于ESS演化博弈的电力市场风险监管防范策略研究

周浩 丁羽 魏旭 李雪松 樊天荣

电气传动2024,Vol.54Issue(4):75-84,10.
电气传动2024,Vol.54Issue(4):75-84,10.DOI:10.19457/j.1001-2095.dqcd24696

基于ESS演化博弈的电力市场风险监管防范策略研究

Study of Risk Regulatory and Prevention Strategy of Electricity Market Based on ESS Evolution Game Theory

周浩 1丁羽 1魏旭 2李雪松 2樊天荣2

作者信息

  • 1. 国网江苏省电力有限公司,江苏南京 210000
  • 2. 江苏电力交易中心有限公司,江苏南京 210000
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

With the continuous promotion of the"double carbon"strategy,the reformation of China's electricity market has entered a new stage,but the overall construction of the electricity market is still in the primary stage,and there is an urgent need to develop a scientific and feasible regulatory prevention strategy.An iterative model of"evolution game—optimized clearing"was established between regulators and risky subjects.A library of market risk and profit indicators was formed.And the risk prevention strategy was quantitatively constructed for the electricity market.The evolutionary stabilization strategy and market risk changes in the process of continuous game interaction between the two participants was explored.Iterative simulations base on real data,the simulation results show that when the market risk is high,after limited rounds of evolutionary game,the regulatory prevention strategy can reduce the degree of transaction risk,which verifies the effectiveness of the regulatory prevention strategy.The proposed method can provide theoretical support for the formulation of electricity market regulatory strategy.

关键词

电力市场风险/量化监管防范策略/演化博弈/优化出清

Key words

power market risk/quantitative regulatory prevention strategy/evolution game/optimal market clearing

分类

信息技术与安全科学

引用本文复制引用

周浩,丁羽,魏旭,李雪松,樊天荣..基于ESS演化博弈的电力市场风险监管防范策略研究[J].电气传动,2024,54(4):75-84,10.

基金项目

国网科技项目(J2021199) (J2021199)

电气传动

OACSTPCD

1001-2095

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