荆楚理工学院学报2024，Vol.39Issue(2)：53-60,8.
高管过度自信、分析师关注与企业金融化
Top Executives'Overconfidence,Analyst Coverage and Enterprise Financialization
代澎瑞 1邹能锋1
作者信息
- 1. 安徽农业大学经济管理学院,安徽合肥 230036
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Based on the background that the development of enterprises presents the phenomenon of"disenchantment from re-ality",starting from the perspective of enterprise executives and taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as re-search sample,we test the relationship between top executives'overconfidence and enterprise financialization,and explore the moderating effect of analyst coverage,an external monitoring,on the relationship between them.The results show that top execu-tives'overconfidence has a positive impact on enterprise financialization,and overconfident executives are more inclined to allo-cate more financial assets.With external coverage and supervision by analysts,enterprise financialization triggered by executive overconfidence can be mitigated to a certain extent.Further transmission path analysis shows that the level of corporate risk-taking mediates the relationship between top executives'overconfidence and enterprise financialization,and that the risk-averse of top executives'overconfidence is one of the reasons for their excessive allocation to financial assets.关键词
高管过度自信/分析师关注/企业金融化Key words
top executives'overconfidence/analyst coverage/enterprise financialization分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
代澎瑞,邹能锋..高管过度自信、分析师关注与企业金融化[J].荆楚理工学院学报,2024,39(2):53-60,8.
