金融理论与教学2024，Vol.42Issue(2)：65-75,11.
政府补助、高管超额薪酬与审计费用
Government Subsidy,Senior Executives'Overpayment and Audit Fees
摘要
Abstract
As the non-recurring profit and loss of listed companies,the government subsidy can bring positive effects,and it can also easily cause the management's speculative mentality which may lead to rent-seeking behaviors and increase agency costs,and finally do produce the fact that the government subsidy is used to whitewash the performance.Therefore,auditing the government subsidy has become a key issue in the field of listed companies'auditing.This paper employs micro-data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2020 to empirically study the relationship among government subsidy,senior executives'overpayment and audit fees.The results show that the government subsidy can significantly increase the company's audit fees,and senior executives'overpayment plays a mediating role to a certain extent;the further analysis shows that the positive relationship between government subsidy and audit fees is more pronounced in those companies that are state-owned,with poor corporate governance,and in the eastern areas.Conclusions of this paper not only enrich the research content of the economic consequences of the government subsidy,but also broaden the research on the influencing factors of audit pricing from the perspective of the government,and provide theoretical basis and empirical support for further improving the allocation of financial resources and optimizing the corporate governance structure.关键词
政府补助/审计收费/高管超额薪酬Key words
government subsidy/audit fees/senior executives'overpayment分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈晓珊,陈思敏..政府补助、高管超额薪酬与审计费用[J].金融理论与教学,2024,42(2):65-75,11.基金项目
广东省自然科学基金面上项目(2022A1515012193). （2022A1515012193）
