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基于动态主从博弈模型的综合能源系统碳交易方法OACSTPCD

A carbon trading method for integrated energy systems based on a dynamic master-slave game model

中文摘要英文摘要

为完善发展碳交易机制中多主体之间的利益互动关系,提出一种以碳交易JMO(联合市场运营商)为领导者、多主体IES(综合能源系统)为跟随者的主从博弈方法,实现不同IES的低碳经济运行.首先,在碳排放阶梯惩罚机制下对各利益主体IES运行效益进行建模分析,提出IES低碳排和低成本双重模式可选的运行策略.其次,基于动态非合作Stackelberg博弈优化框架,根据各利益主体的运行模式,建立多主体参与的碳交易模型.最后,分别采用自适应差分进化算法和Gurobi求解器对主从博弈决策模型进行求解.算例分析结果表明,该碳交易机制可有效实现IES运行的低碳性和经济性.

To enhance the interaction among multiple agents in carbon trading mechanisms,a leader-follower game method is proposed,with carbon trading JMO(joint market operator)as the leader and multiple IES(integrated en-ergy systems)as followers.This method aims to achieve low-carbon economic operation for different IES.Firstly,un-der the tiered penalty mechanism for carbon emission,the operational benefits of various agents'IES are modeled and analyzed.A dual-mode operation strategy for IES,which includes options for low carbon emission and low cost,is proposed.Secondly,based on the dynamic non-cooperative Stackelberg game optimization framework,a carbon trading model involving multiple agents is established according to the operational modes of each agent.Finally,the decision-making model of the leader-follower game is solved using both adaptive differential evolution(DE)algo-rithm and the Gurobi optimizer.Case analysis results demonstrate that this carbon trading mechanism can effectively achieve both low-carbon and economic operation for IES.

陈勇;芮俊;肖雷鸣;邓超

杭州市电力设计院有限公司余杭分公司,杭州 311121杭州电子科技大学 自动化学院,杭州 310018

低碳综合能源系统碳排放碳交易动态非合作Stackelberg博弈

low carbonIEScarbon emissioncarbon tradingdynamic non-cooperative Stackelberg game

《浙江电力》 2024 (004)

51-62 / 12

浙江大有集团有限公司科技项目(DY2022-22);浙江省科技计划项目(2024C01018)

10.19585/j.zjdl.202404006

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