经济与管理2024，Vol.38Issue(3)：55-64,10.
薪酬管制能促进企业"脱虚还实"吗?
Does the Salary Limit Promote"Transformation from Virtual to Real"?Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment of"Pay Ceiling Order"
摘要
Abstract
Considering the"pay ceiling order"policy implemented in 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment for assessing compensation control,this study utilizes A-share non-financial listed company data from 2012 to 2022.A double-difference model is employed to examine the impact of the"pay ceiling order"on the financialization of enterprises and explore the effect of salary limit on the phenom-enon of enterprises'"transformation from virtual to real".The findings of the research are as follows:Firstly,the compensation control policy significantly restrains the asset allocation behavior of state-owned enterprises.This is primarily achieved by suppressing the"reservoir"motivation for financialization and lowering the risk preferences of management,thereby encouraging enterprises to shift from virtual to real assets.Secondly,the compensation control policy exhibits structural differences in the profitability of financial asset types and channels.It manifests a more pronounced inhibitory effect on speculative and hedging financial assets,as well as risk-prone financial channels.Finally,the compensation control policy actively influences the core business and tangible investments of enterpri-ses,promoting the optimization of resource allocation in enterprises.关键词
薪酬管制/企业金融化/蓄水池动机/管理层风险偏好Key words
salary limit/corporate financialization/reservoir motivation/management risk preference分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李冬伟,方俊..薪酬管制能促进企业"脱虚还实"吗?[J].经济与管理,2024,38(3):55-64,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(72162017) （72162017）
