信息工程大学学报2024，Vol.25Issue(2)：235-241,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1671-0673.2024.02.016
三方视角下的军事危机应对策略演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Military Crisis Response Strategies from a Tripartite Perspective
张一帆 1耿帅 1郭勇2
作者信息
- 1. 军事科学院研究生院,北京 100091||军事科学院战略评估咨询中心,北京 100091
- 2. 信息工程大学,河南郑州 450001
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Considering the tripartite game system of"2 strong and 1 weak",in the case that extrater-ritorial power intervenes the military crisis,this paper analyzes the influence factors of three parts'strategies in military crisis.It uses the evolutionary game theory to establish the evolutionary game model of the strategies for trigger(MCT),intervener(MCI)and responder(MCR)in military crisis,then it analyzes the stability of three parts'strategies,and establishes the system dynamics(SD)model for simulation experiments.Finally,it analyzes the influences of the initial probabilities of tri-partite strategy selection,and the counterattack intensity of the MCR to MCT.The results are as fol-lows:the independent initial probabilities of MCT,MCI and MCR to choose confrontation,active in-tervention and aggressive response,all exert an important impact on the evolution of their respective strategy.Increasing the degree of counterattack by the MCR against the MCT will help reverse the strategies'development of MCI and MCT.When MCI chooses active intervention,it's not enough to increase the degree of counterattack by the MCR against the MCT,and it's also necessary for MCR to raise the initial probability of aggressive response to reverse MCT's strategy.关键词
三方视角/军事危机/应对策略/演化博弈Key words
tripartite perspective/military crisis/response strategy/evolutionary game分类
军事科技引用本文复制引用
张一帆,耿帅,郭勇..三方视角下的军事危机应对策略演化博弈分析[J].信息工程大学学报,2024,25(2):235-241,7.
