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收获当下还是投资未来?制造业上市公司中控股股东对财务冗余积累及配置决策的影响研究

游夏蕾 贾生华

管理工程学报2024,Vol.38Issue(3):91-107,17.
管理工程学报2024,Vol.38Issue(3):91-107,17.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2024.03.007

收获当下还是投资未来?制造业上市公司中控股股东对财务冗余积累及配置决策的影响研究

Invest for the future or reap the present?A study on the influence of owner identity on a firm's slack allocation decision

游夏蕾 1贾生华2

作者信息

  • 1. 浙江工业大学 管理学院,浙江 杭州 310023
  • 2. 浙江大学 管理学院,浙江 杭州 310058
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Whether a firm should retain organizational slack and where should the retained organizational slack be allocated are basic and important theoretical questions in organizational studies.The existing literature has documented both positive and negative attributes of organizational slack,and different scholars have given their own answers to the above questions based on their understanding of such attributes.However,few studies have considered the decision makers'perspective on the allocation of a firm's slack resources.In fact,as a kind of"remaining"or"excess"resources,organizational slack is objective and neutral.Whether it will be a"loss of efficiency"or a"need of flexibility"depends on where and how the slack resources are deployed and used,while these allocation decisions are further determined by who owns and controls these resources.To answer such basic questions,we introduce the controlling shareholders,as a typical decision-maker in determining the allocation of a firm's slack resources,into our theoretical model and analyze how they affect the allocation of a firm's financial slack related to their decision-makings. The reason why some scholars hold a negative view on financial slack is that they regard it as an important source of agency problems.In the real business world,if the controlling shareholders regard financial slack as a source of agency problems,they will try their best to reduce the existence of these resources or weaken the control of managers on the existing financial slack,among which dividend is an effective strategy.Conversely,if the controlling shareholders hold a positive view on financial slack,i.e.,they believe that financial slack can contribute to the innovation and future growth of their firm,they may give up the capture of the immediate value,i.e.to use these resources for dividends,but tend to leave these resources in the firm and transfer the control of them to the managers to support their innovation decisions.In this regard,this paper tries to analyze and examine the influence of controlling shareholders on the retention and allocation decisions of financial slack.Specifically,it introduces two important equity elements as moderators,i.e.,shareholder identity and equity concentration,to examine their impacts on the relationships between financial slack and dividend and innovation investments. Using a data of A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2012 to 2017 in China,we have found that financial slack is positively related to a firm's R&D investments,and the effect is moderated by the identity of the controlling shareholder.In firms controlled by beneficiary shareholders,the effect gets stronger.The results also indicate that the negative effect of financial slack on a firm's dividends is completely moderated by the firm's equity structure.In companies controlled by beneficiary shareholders,financial slack is less likely to be used for dividends,and this negative relationship will be further strengthened by equity concentration.A series of robustness tests are conducted to ensure the stability and reliability of the results.First,we re-coded and replaced the classification of shareholder identity by dividing controlling shareholders into state-owned shareholders and private shareholders,and did not find any changes in the regression results.Then,we grouped the samples according to the identity of the controlling shareholders and performed regression analysis in different subsamples,and the results are still relatively stable.Besides,in order to solve the potential endogeneity problem caused by missing explanatory variables,we also tried the instrumental variable method.The results of Ivtobit regression analysis show that"the total assets of financial institutions where the enterprise is located"as an instrumental variable can largely resolve the endogeneity problems in the regression models of financial slack and dividends. These results illustrate that the exercise of rights by controlling shareholders affects the configuration of a firm's financial slack.Specifically,the controlling shareholders(especially beneficiary shareholders)pay more attention to the positive effect of financial slack on the value creation potentials of the company than the agency problem caused by the existence of financial slack.This study enhances our understanding of the important theoretical controversy of whether enterprises should retain or eliminate organizational slack.

关键词

组织冗余/财务冗余/冗余配置/股东身份/股权集中度

Key words

Organizational slack/Financial slack/Slack configuration/Shareholder identity/Ownership concentration

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

游夏蕾,贾生华..收获当下还是投资未来?制造业上市公司中控股股东对财务冗余积累及配置决策的影响研究[J].管理工程学报,2024,38(3):91-107,17.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金项目(72102213、72072159) The National Natural Science Foundation of China(72102213,72072159) (72102213、72072159)

管理工程学报

OA北大核心CHSSCDCSSCICSTPCD

1004-6062

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