| 注册
首页|期刊导航|管理工程学报|双重制度视角下政府补贴对企业研发投入影响悖论的新解与验证

双重制度视角下政府补贴对企业研发投入影响悖论的新解与验证

林春培 朱晓艳 曾志盛 余传鹏

管理工程学报2024,Vol.38Issue(3):108-121,14.
管理工程学报2024,Vol.38Issue(3):108-121,14.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2024.03.008

双重制度视角下政府补贴对企业研发投入影响悖论的新解与验证

A new explanation and verification of the paradox of government subsidies'influence on enterprise R&D investment from the perspective of dual-institutional elements

林春培 1朱晓艳 2曾志盛 2余传鹏3

作者信息

  • 1. 华侨大学 工商管理学院,福建 泉州 362021||华侨大学 商务管理研究中心,福建 泉州 362021
  • 2. 华侨大学 工商管理学院,福建 泉州 362021
  • 3. 华南理工大学 旅游管理系,广东 广州 510006
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment has long been debated.One view holds that government subsidies have an incentive effect,reducing the concerns and risks of enterprise technical knowledge spillover,improving R&D enthusiasm,and promoting enterprises to increase R&D investment.Another perspective is that government subsidies have an inhibitory effect,inducing enterprises to carry out rent-seeking activities and transfer the funds planned for R&D activities elsewhere,thereby reducing enterprise R&D investment.The main reason for the inconsistent views is that no research has comprehensively superpositioned the incentive and inhibition effects of government subsidies,and considered the institutional integration of government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.Formal systems,such as legal provisions and enterprise systems,and informal systems,such as interpersonal relations and traditional customs,are the key variables affecting the implementation efficiency of government subsidies.Scholars have not yet explored this topic.Thus,this paper introduces the institutional theory and attempts to build a conceptual relationship model containing dual institutional elements to analyze the impact of government subsidies on enterprise R&D investment. Based on signal theory and rent-seeking theory,this paper deeply analyzes the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.It introduces the institutional theory to explore the political connection at the external informal institutional level and the regulatory effect of equity incentives at the internal formal institutional level.Taking China A-share listed companies between 2008 and 2020 as the research object,the general OLS regression model is used to test the research hypothesis.The results show that:1)moderate government subsidies can promote R&D investment,that is,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment;2)Political connection negatively moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment;3)Equity incentive and government subsidies have complementary effects,which can not only offset the possible inhibiting effect of excessive subsidy,but also further enhance the incentive effect of the initial subsidy on enterprise R&D investment,and change the inverted U-shaped relationship between the two into a positive linear relationship.In addition,this paper uses the PSM test,instrumental variable method,and substitution variable method to test the robustness,which suggests that the research conclusion is valid. The theoretical contribution of this paper is reflected in the following three ways.1)Based on the signal theory and rent-seeking theory,the existing literature has formed a completely opposite view of the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment because it ignores the superposition of the incentive and inhibition effects derived from the two theories.In this paper,the incentive effect brought by the identity recognition of government subsidies and the inhibitory effect brought by rent-seeking are included in the impact analysis of government subsidies on enterprise R&D investment.This eliminates the limitations and conflict of views of the existing research on the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment from a single perspective.It also promotes the integrated development of signal theory,rent-seeking theory,and other relevant theoretical viewpoints.2)Previous studies have noted the impact of internal and external factors on the relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment,but pay insufficient attention to the institutional factors,especially the differentiation of different institutional elements.This paper introduces the institutional theory,which provides a new analytical framework for exploring the complex relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment in China.At the same time,it promotes the use of the institutional theory in researching the impact effect of government subsidies,while expanding the application context and interpretation scope of institutional theory,and the theoretical perspective of studying the complex relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.3)Existing studies have empirically discussed the regulatory effect of formal or informal institutional elements on the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment,but the consideration of these institutional elements is too single,limited to the internal or external environment of the organization,and ignoring the possible differential impact of different institutional elements.Based on the dual perspectives of the formal system inside the organization and the informal system outside the organization,this study empirically investigates the complex effect of equity incentive and political connection on the impact of government subsidies on enterprise R&D investment.The research conclusion provides empirical support and evidence for taking institutional integration into consideration in the impact effect of government subsidies.The conclusion enriches the knowledge of the institutional elements and types that affect the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.The conclusion of this paper also provides enlightenment for the government and enterprises.When formulating subsidy policies,the government should dynamically monitor the whole process of enterprise R&D activities,determine the appropriate scale of government subsidies,and avoid the phenomenon that enterprises seek rent from the government for private interests,which leads to the inhibitory effect of excessive subsidies on enterprise R&D investment.While establishing and maintaining a good interactive relationship between enterprises and the government,there is a need to strengthen the management of innovation resources,cultivate innovation ability,improve the use efficiency of government subsidies,and prevent excessive dependence on government subsidies.In addition,enterprises should actively establish effective equity incentive systems to weaken the inhibitory effect of excessive subsidies on enterprise R&D investment and enhance the incentive effect of government subsidies.

关键词

政府补贴/正式制度/非正式制度/研发投入

Key words

Government subsidies/Formal system/Informal system/R&D investment

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

林春培,朱晓艳,曾志盛,余传鹏..双重制度视角下政府补贴对企业研发投入影响悖论的新解与验证[J].管理工程学报,2024,38(3):108-121,14.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金项目(71974059) (71974059)

华侨大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(22SKGC-QT03) (22SKGC-QT03)

国家社会科学基金项目(18ZDA062) The National Natural Science Foundation of China(71974059) (18ZDA062)

The Huaqiao University's Academic Project Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(22SKGC-QT03) (22SKGC-QT03)

The National Social Science Foundation of China(18ZDA062) (18ZDA062)

管理工程学报

OA北大核心CHSSCDCSSCICSTPCD

1004-6062

访问量3
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文