运筹与管理2024，Vol.33Issue(3)：218-225,8.DOI:10.12005/orms.2024.0101
政府不同奖惩措施下消费者参与快递包装回收行为演化研究
Research on the Evolution of Consumers Participation in Express Package Recycling under Different Government Rewards and Punishments
摘要
Abstract
Accompanied by the development of e-commerce,the express delivery industry has been growing rapidly,which directly drives the massive increase in the volume of express delivery business.Express packaging waste has become the main force of urban garbage increment,bringing great challenges to the ecological resources and environment.The whole society has become faced with accelerating the recovery and managing express packaging and urgently needs to solve the problem.The overall recovery rate of national express packa-ging waste is less than 20％.Multi-factors constrain the effectiveness of recycling,in which the consumer as a key participant in the recovery of express packaging,the implementer,which lacks the necessary incentives is an important factor in restricting the effectiveness of recycling.For consumers to participate in express packaging recycling behavior,that the government only guides the publicity is not enough,so the study of the government to develop what kind of incentives,rewards and punishments to improve consumer recycling enthusiasm is of practical significance. Most of the domestic and international scholars'studies on consumers'participation in express packaging recycling behavior have been carried out with experiments and statistical analyses.The research focuses on the government's regulatory measures and the influencing factors that affect consumers'recycling behavior.However,from a systematic perspective,the study of the interaction mechanism between consumer express pack-aging behavior and government regulatory policies is rarely involved.In the face of increasing express packaging waste and low consumer participation in express packaging recycling,in order to improve consumer participation in express packaging recycling,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government regulators and consumers under the government's static and dynamic incentives and penalties,analyzes the stabilization strategies of the two sides of the game,and explores the impact of different government policies and measures on the consumer's participation in express packaging recycling behavior.The study investigates the impact of different government policy measures on consumers'participation in express packaging recycling behavior,and carries out simulation analysis.The research shows that the system has no equilibrium and stability point,and neither party has a stable strategy under the government's static rewards and punishments;dynamic rewards and punishments can effectively promote consumers'participation in express packaging recycling behavior,and both parties have reached an evolutionary stable state;dynamic rewards and static punishment measures have the best reward effect on consumer recycling behavior;the probability of consumers'participation in express packaging recycling behavior is directly proportional to the government's punishment,and inversely proportional to the upper limit of rewards,the cost of government regulation and the cost of participation in recycling. Therefore,based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward three countermeasure suggestions,with a view to providing reference for the government to implement different policies in response to the realistic dilem-mas and specific situations of consumers'participation in express packaging recycling,so as to effectively promote the solution of the governance problem of express packaging recycling.First,the government should adopt dynamic reward and punishment policy measures.Second,the government should innovate regulatory methods,broaden regulatory channels and reduce regulatory costs.Third,the government should establish a perfect express packaging recycling system to reduce the cost of consumer participation in express packaging recycling.关键词
快递包装/回收行为/不同奖惩措施/演化博弈Key words
express packaging/recycling behavior/different reward and punishment measures/evolutionary game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
成灶平,丛培栋,马良..政府不同奖惩措施下消费者参与快递包装回收行为演化研究[J].运筹与管理,2024,33(3):218-225,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573185) （71573185）
国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BZZ066) （20BZZ066）
