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全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理监管机制研究OACHSSCD

Research on Principal-agent Supervision Mechanism for the Ownership of Natural Resource Assets Owned by the Whole People

中文摘要英文摘要

文章归纳了行政委托代理理论在中国的发展历程,分析了全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理机制的形成背景、运行机制及其双重属性,同时研究剖析自然资源资产委托代理机制实践,指出当前监管机制的不足之处.研究显示:监管机制中存在"监管轻视""违规再委托""权利残缺"等问题,其原因在于监管角色不明确和监管模式缺陷.基于此,提出通过探索厘清监管角色、改善监管模式等方式,完善全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理监管机制的建议.

The paper summarizes the development process of the administrative principal-agent theory in China,analyzes the formation background,operation mechanism,and dual attributes of the principal-agent mechanism for the ownership of natural resource assets owned by the whole people,and studies and analyzes the practice of the principal-agent mechanism for natural resource assets,and highlights the shortcomings of the current supervision mechanism.The research shows that there are problems in the regulatory mechanism,such as making light of regulatory,illegal redelegation,and disability of rights,which are caused by the unclear role of supervision and the defects of supervision mode.Based on this,the paper suggests improving the principal-agent supervision mechanism for the ownership of natural resource assets owned by the whole people by exploring and clarifying the role of supervision and improving the supervision mode.

马羽男;杨国强;赵学刚

西南政法大学经济法学院,重庆 401120西南大学法学院,重庆 400700

经济学

自然资源资产所有权委托代理监管机制

natural resource assetsownershipprincipal-agentsupervision mechanism

《中国国土资源经济》 2024 (005)

46-53,70 / 9

重庆市社会科学规划重大课题项目"农村集体资产管理制度研究"(2023NDZD04)

10.19676/j.cnki.1672-6995.001025

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