科学与管理2024，Vol.44Issue(3)：69-77,86,10.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-8256.2024.03.010
碳限额管制、零售商利他偏好与制造企业的绿色决策研究
A Research on Carbon Cap Control,Retailers'Altruistic Preferences and Green Decision-Making by Manufacturing Firms
摘要
Abstract
With the rapid development of the manufacturing industry and the enhancement of public awareness of low carbon,the green supply chain has developed rapidly.This paper takes the government-led,two-stage green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer as the research object,and sets a game model in which manufacturers purchase carbon credits while carrying out green technology innovation or completely purchasing carbon credits,and retailers have a preference for altruism or non-altruistic preferences.The Stackelberg game was used to analyze government carbon cap control,retailers'retail prices,manufacturers'carbon reduction efforts,and market output under the carbon market trading scenario.Studies have shown that:1)governments set looser carbon caps for manufacturers when retailers have no altruistic preferences;2)When manufacturers make carbon reduction decisions,social welfare,market demand,product prices and greenness are not affected by retailers'altruistic preferences;3)While a retailer's altruistic preference is detrimental to its own profits,it can help increase manufacturers'profits,thereby contributing to the stability of the supply chain;4)When the market carbon price is low,encouraging manufacturers to carry out green technology innovation will bring higher social welfare to society,and vice versa,not carrying out green technology innovation can bring higher social welfare to society.关键词
绿色技术创新/利他偏好/碳限额/碳交易Key words
green technology innovation/altruistic preferences/carbon caps/carbon trading分类
资源环境引用本文复制引用
闫旭,杨皎平,万璐鑫..碳限额管制、零售商利他偏好与制造企业的绿色决策研究[J].科学与管理,2024,44(3):69-77,86,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(214ZD120) （214ZD120）
山东省软科学项目(2021RKY01006) （2021RKY01006）
