基于群体参与的网络谣言治理模型研究OA

Most of existing studies have found that under strong regulatory measures,online rumors continue to emerge,post-truth mode of information release led to the relevant regulatory agencies unable to keep pace with rumors and tired of dealing with them.Based on the static game profit matrix of both sides,this paper studies the behavior strategy choice of net citizens by using the Ev-olutionary Game theory,and constructs its dynamic evolution game model.It is pointed out that the mismatch between rumor-mak-ing and governance mode is the mechanism of the governance dilemma of Internet rumor.Mathematical analysis proves the effec-tiveness of group participation in Internet Rumor Governance,and a simple model is proposed to encourage group participation in Internet rumor governance.This paper gives some measures to promote the cooperation of Internet users in rumor governance.This paper provides a new idea for the effective governance of Internet rumors.