金融理论与教学2024，Vol.42Issue(3)：53-58,6.
论无限次重复囚徒困境博弈中的针锋相对策略
Tit-for-Tat Strategy in the Infinitely Repeated Dilemma of the Prisoner
摘要
Abstract
In the finitely repeated dilemma of the prisoner,the choice of rational players not to cooperate in each stage of the game is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,so there will be no cooperative behavior.However,in the infinitely repeated dilemma of the prisoner,the fact that players adopt certain specific strategies may lead to cooperative outcomes.The grim trigger strategy is a strategy for promoting cooperation that is discussed in almost all game theory books,but scholars rarely refer to the tit-for-tat strategy.This paper rigorously demonstrates the conditions under which the tit-for-tat strategy forms Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.The results indicate that when players pay enough attention to the future and when the payoffs of the stage game meet certain conditions,the tit-for-tat strategy can form Nash equilibrium and its requirements for discount rate are higher than those of the grim trigger strategy.This paper also indicates that the tit-for-tat strategy does form subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,but it requires very strict conditions.In addition to the specific conditions for payoffs,it also requires that the discount rate must take a specific value.关键词
无限次重复囚徒困境博弈/冷酷触发策略/针锋相对策略/子博弈精炼纳什均衡Key words
infinitely repeated dilemma of the prisoner/grim trigger strategy/tit-for-tat strategy/subgame perfect Nash equilibrium分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王春雷,黄素心..论无限次重复囚徒困境博弈中的针锋相对策略[J].金融理论与教学,2024,42(3):53-58,6.基金项目
广西高等教育本科教学改革工程重点项目"经济类专业课程思政供给侧改革探索与实践"(2021JGZ114). （2021JGZ114）
