管理工程学报2024，Vol.38Issue(4)：88-103,16.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2024.04.006
董事高管责任保险与真实盈余管理——基于凸显效应
Directors'and officers'liability insurance and real earnings management:Based on the salience effect
摘要
Abstract
Changes in the external environment increase risks for managers and enterprises.Therefore,to reduce the impact of external risks,improve risk tolerance,and gain a comparative advantage,managers and enterprises often use earnings management and other means to smoothen profit and manage risk.Insurance can replace the improper methods of risk management used by enterprises and improve the efficiency of risk management.Directors'and officers'liability insurance(D&O insurance)refers to an insurance in which firm management is held accountable for misconduct while performing its duties,and the insurance company is responsible for the consequences of the managers'actions.Since insurance is the subject matter of the decision-makers and executors of corporate earnings management,the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings management has always attracted a lot of attention from scholars.However,most of the literature uses data from developed countries and yields conflicting evidence.On the one hand,D&O insurance can play a role in risk incentives and external supervision in reducing earnings management,and on the other hand,it triggers moral hazard and opportunistic behavior,thereby aggravating earnings manipulation.This lack of consensus in the literature has also attracted the attention of many researchers. However,the literature has mainly focused on accrual earnings management.Because of the excellent concealment,strong controllability,lower litigation risk,and greater operating space,real earnings management(REM)has become the main method of corporate earnings management.Compared with accrual earnings management,REM is,theoretically,the least likely case in the research of D&O insurance and earnings management.In the literature,the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings management mainly focuses on external supervision and moral hazard hypotheses.External supervision is more difficult to observe and cannot influence REM due to its strong concealment.Moreover,managers with opportunistic motives are less likely to use REM due to its higher usage costs.The literature pays less attention to the development of D&O insurance,and there are differences in the effectiveness of D&O insurance in different regions.At present,Chinese D&O insurance is just the literal translations of foreign contractual agreements,with vague expressions and unclear boundaries of responsibility.Localization affects the original governance effectiveness;D&O insurance in China is currently in the development stage. Considering the two limitations discussed above,this study extends the research of Hu(2019)and Yuan(2016)and uses behavioral signal theory to supplement D&O insurance's impact on REM.Using data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009-2020,this study examines the impact and role of D&O insurance on REM.We provide empirical evidence that Chinese listed companies'subscription to D&O insurance negatively affects REM.This relationship remains valid after several robustness tests,such as the two-stage least squares instrumental variable method,Heckman two-stage test,propensity score matching procedure,controlling for missing variables,the impact of events,and earnings management methods,and adjusting the sample interval.From the perspective of external supervision,further analysis shows the following.First,subscribing to D&O insurance attracts media attention,which in turn negatively affects REM.Second,subscribing to D&O insurance reduces analyst attention;analyst attention negatively affects REM,therefore analyst concerns have a positive masking effect in the negative relationship between D&O insurance and REM.Third,in the relationship between D&O insurance and REM,the supervision intermediary of the insurance companies is not significant. This paper makes the following contributions to the literature.First,with the increasingly blurred corporate boundaries,corporate governance requires internal and external coordination.Media attention can function as external supervision(which can be triggered)and make up for the inadequacies in existing supervision.Secondly,against the realistic background of the accumulation of various risks,purchasing D&O insurance reduces managers'risk-taking and risk behavior of enterprises'REM,which provides managers,investors,and regulators with practical measures for risk governance.Last,introducing foreign governance initiatives in a less-than-perfect corporate governance context is not without advantages.In such an environment,external stakeholders mostly rely on intermediaries,such as analysts and the media,for their information needs.Novel measures attract the attention of the media and public,forming the unique impact of the measures during the development period.This reveals a characteristic advantage of China's corporate governance and the advantage of weak governance situations.It inspires the development of Chinese enterprises and the insurance industry.It also has significance for China and other developing countries to introduce foreign insurance and other corporate governance measures.关键词
董事高管责任保险/盈余管理/行为信号理论/公司治理/弱治理情境Key words
Directors'and officers'liability insurance/Earnings management/Behavioral signal theory/Corporate governance/Weak governance situation分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
屈伸,陈朝龙,陈宁,陈璐..董事高管责任保险与真实盈余管理——基于凸显效应[J].管理工程学报,2024,38(4):88-103,16.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(72072019) The National Natural Science Foundation of China(72072019) （72072019）
