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CEO任期、薪酬激励与企业双元创新

马有才 董力

技术与创新管理2024,Vol.45Issue(4):391-399,9.
技术与创新管理2024,Vol.45Issue(4):391-399,9.DOI:10.14090/j.cnki.jscx.2024.0405

CEO任期、薪酬激励与企业双元创新

CEO Tenure,Compensation Incentive and Corporate Ambidextrous Innovation

马有才 1董力1

作者信息

  • 1. 山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛 266590
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Ambidextrous innovation is an important approach to sustainable development of enterprises,the impact of CEO tenure on enterprise ambidextrous innovation has not yet reached a unified conclu-sion.Taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2022 as samples,the paper uses the fixed effect model to explore the relationship between CEO tenure and enterprise ambi-dextrous innovation.The results show that CEO tenure has a negative impact on exploratory innovation,and a positive impact on exploitative innovation;that compensation incentive plays a significant positive role in the regulation of CEO tenure and exploitative innovation,but the positive regulation of CEO ten-ure and exploratory innovation is not significant;that CEO tenure inhibits exploratory innovation by re-ducing the level of enterprise risk taking,and promotes exploitative innovation by alleviating financing constraints;and that the relationship between CEO tenure and ambidextrous innovation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises.These conclusions not only enrich the literature in the field of ambidextrous innovation,but also have certain enlightening significance for enterprises to scientifically improve the CEO appointment system and incentive system.

关键词

双元创新/CEO任期/薪酬激励/风险承担/融资约束

Key words

ambidextrous innovation/CEO tenure/compensation incentive/risk-taking level/finance constraint

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

马有才,董力..CEO任期、薪酬激励与企业双元创新[J].技术与创新管理,2024,45(4):391-399,9.

基金项目

教育部人文社科基金项目"产业集群升级与可持续创新型城市建设互动机理与政策研究"(17YJA790065) (17YJA790065)

技术与创新管理

OACHSSCD

1672-7312

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