技术与创新管理2024，Vol.45Issue(5)：553-566,14.DOI:10.14090/j.cnki.jscx.2024.0508
基于动态博弈的环境规制与绿色制造研究
A Study on Environmental Regulation and Green Manufacturing Based on Dynamic Game Theory
摘要
Abstract
Based on stakeholder theory and ambidextrous innovation theory,this paper uses dynamic game analysis and panel threshold test to study the intrinsic link between environmental regulation and green innovation bottlenecks.By constructing a two-stage dynamic game model of"local government-manufacturing enterprise",the paper summarizes the Nash equilibrium conditions for manufacturing en-terprises to choose proactive green innovation or cautious green innovation under strict or loose environ-mental regulation.Then,using panel threshold model and data from 1,092 listed manufacturing compa-nies in 31 provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions in China,the paper empirically studies the bottleneck effect of local government environmental regulation intensity on manufacturing enterprise green innovation input,thus further verifying the practical validity of the game model.The study finds that:environmental regulation policies will cause upstream raw material prices to rise and produce green cost bottlenecks that inhibit enterprise innovation willingness in the process of encouraging regu-lated enterprises to transform green;that green transformation enterprises from"incremental innova-tion"to"radical innovation"often accompanied by huge changes in production mode,and will lead to green technology bottlenecks that enterprises cannot adapt to.Based on the above analysis,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions around supply chain layout,innovation network construc-tion and science and technology finance coordination.关键词
环境规制/绿色创新/绿色制造/动态博弈/面板门槛Key words
environmental regulation/green innovation/green manufacturing/dynamic game/panel threshold分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈庆..基于动态博弈的环境规制与绿色制造研究[J].技术与创新管理,2024,45(5):553-566,14.基金项目
国家社会科学基金一般项目"中国共产党科技创新思想体系研究"(20BDJ006) （20BDJ006）
